INTRODUCTION
Non-cooperative games are basic economic models, with Nash In order to be a useful solution, a Nash equilibrium must be found by some method (including any adjustment process). For larger games this requires computer algorithms. We consider bimatrix games (two-player games in strategic form), for which one equilibrium is found by the algorithm by Lemke and Howson (1964) . Finding all equilibria is feasible only for a few dozen strategies per player due to the exponential number of possible mixed equilibrium strategies (Avis et al., 2010) .
In this paper, we study rank-1 games, where the sum of the two payoff matrices has matrix rank one. They generalize zero-sum games where that matrix rank is zero. Rank-1 games are more economically more interesting than zerosum games, by allowing a "multiplicative" interaction in addition to an arbitrary zero-sum component, which we discuss further in Section 2. Like general bimatrix games, they can have many disjoint equilibria. On the other hand, as we show, they are computationally tractable: One equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found quickly (in polynomial time), and finding all equilibria takes comparable time to finding a single equilibrium of a general bimatrix game. Large rank-1 games are therefore attractive as detailed models of interaction, on a similar scale to, but more general than, zero-sum games or linear programs. Rank-1 bimatrix games and their computational analysis should therefore become a new tool in economic modeling.
The computational complexity (required running time) of computing a Nash equilibrium of a game has received substantial interest in theoretical computer science. A computational problem is considered tractable if it can be solved in polynomial time. 1 Savani and von Stengel (2006) showed that the algorithm by Lemke and Howson (1964) may have exponential running time. Their examples may be rare and comparable to exponential running times of the simplex algorithm for linear programming (Klee and Minty, 1972) , which works well in practice. The path-following Lemke-Howson algorithm implies that finding an equilibrium of a bimatrix game belongs to the complexity class PPAD defined by Papadimitriou (1984) . PPAD describes certain computational problems where the existence of a solution is known, and the problem is to find one explicit solution. 2 Other problems in PPAD include the computation of an approximate Brouwer fixed point, and related problems in economics such as market equilibria (Vazirani and Yannakakis, 2011) , including the computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game with many players. 3 A celebrated result is that all problems in PPAD can be reduced to finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game, which makes this problem "PPAD-complete" (Chen and Deng, 2006; Chen et al., 2009; Daskalakis et al., 2009) . No polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium of a general bimatrix game is known. Kannan and Theobald (2010) introduced a hierarchy of bimatrix games based on their rank, defined as the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. In the present paper, we prove that a Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found in polynomial time, even though (another new result) a rank-1 game may have exponentially many equilibria. Moreover, as has been proved separately (Mehta, 2014; Chen and Paparas, 2017) , games of rank 2 are PPAD-hard and thus as computationally difficult as general bimatrix games. In the context of the "rank" hierarchy, rank-1 games are therefore the most complex type of games that are computationally tractable.
In Section 2, we present an example of an economic model based on rank-1 1 Polynomial time means that a problem described by n bits is solved in time O(n k ) for some fixed (typically small) exponent k. Then doubling the input size n implies an increase of the running time by a factor of 2 k , which is "scalable" with additional computing power. In contrast, exponential running time such as c n for some c > 1 quickly limits the size n of problems that can ever be solved in practice. This contrast between polynomial and exponential time complexity becomes the more pronounced the more powerful computers become. For further discussion see Roughgarden (2010) . 2 In contrast, the better known complexity class NP applies to "decision problems" which have a "yes" or "no" answer. 3 In games with three or more players (unlike in two-player games), the mixed strategy probabilities in a Nash equilibrium may be irrational numbers. A suitable concept for such games is approximate Nash equilibrium, where finding an exact Nash equilibrium is an even harder computational problem (Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010). games. Section 3 states the notation and preliminary results used in this paper. Its main observation (Theorem 6) shows that the set of equilibria of a game of rank k is the intersection of a hyperplane with a parameterized set games of rank k − 1. When k = 1, this set of parameterized zero-sum games corresponds to a parameterized linear program (LP), for which we recall relevant results from Adler and Monteiro (1992) in Section 4. The intersection with the hyperplane gives rise to the polynomial-time binary search for one equilibrium of a rank-1 game, explained in Section 5. In Section 6, we describe completely the set of all Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game. Using standard results from the "smoothed analysis" of parameterized LPs, we show that rank-1 games with perturbed data have on average polynomially many equilibria. An example of the main ideas is given in Section 7 (which may be consulted in between). A construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria is shown in Section 8. In Section 9, we describe a variant of the structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) with a new homeomorphism between the space of bimatrix games and its equilibrium correspondence that preserves the sum of the payoff matrices, and hence the rank of the games. Section 10 concludes.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in Adsul et al. (2011) , and the result of Section 8 in von Stengel (2012). The mathematical development in the present paper is almost entirely new in all parts.
AN ECONOMIC APPLICATION OF RANK-1 GAMES
In this section we describe an economic situation as a rank-1 game. We emphasize that this just a starting point for possible economic models for rank-1 games, and not a central contribution of this paper.
Suppose player 1 is a seller of a product who can choose possible quality levels a i for i = 1, . . . , m, and player 2 is a buyer who can decide on possible quantity levels b j for j = 1, . . . , n that she buys from the seller. A price p ij that is paid from buyer to seller can be chosen completely arbitrarily for each i and j. Suppose there are further parameters α, β, γ j , and δ i so that the payoff to the players are (1) payoff to player 1 :
We further assume that β > α > 0, which reflects that high quality is costly to produce for player 1 and beneficial for player 2, with (β − α) representing the benefits from trade. The additional parameter γ j (increasing with b j ) is an additional benefit to player 1 for higher sold quantities, and similarly δ i for player 2 for higher quality. Both γ j and δ i do not affect best responses and can thus be assumed to be zero to give a strategically equivalent game whose sums of payoffs are (β − α)a i b j and therefore of rank one. Because rank-1 games can be analysed very quickly, this "trade game" can be studied for large values of m and n, and in particular for its possibly many price levels. Bulow and Levin (2006) consider a "multiplication game" which is a matching game between n workers and n firms where the suitability of a worker for a firm is described by a matrix of rank one. However, it is a game with 2n players, not two players.
The concrete economic interpretation of such games remains to be investigated.
BIMATRIX GAMES AND RANK REDUCTION
In this section we state our notation for bimatrix games and recall the "complementarity" characterization of Nash equilibria. For games of rank k (see Definition 3), our central observation is Theorem 6 which states that their set of Nash equilibria is the intersection of a set N of equilibria of parameterized games of rank k − 1 with a suitable hyperplane. In subsequent sections, we show how to exploit this property algorithmically when k = 1. We use the following notation. Let 0 and 1 be vectors with all components equal to 0 and 1, respectively, their dimension depending on the context. The transpose of a matrix C is written C . All vectors are column vectors, so if x ∈ R m then x is an m × 1 matrix and x is the corresponding row vector in R 1×m . In matrix products, scalars are treated like 1 × 1 matrices. Inequalities like x ≥ 0 hold for all components. The components of a vector x ∈ R m are x 1 , . . . , x m .
For c ∈ R k and γ ∈ R, a hyperplane is of the form {z ∈ R k | c z = γ}, and a halfspace of the form {z ∈ R k | c z ≤ γ}. A polyhedron is an intersection of finitely many halfspaces, and called a polytope if it is bounded. A face of a polyhedron P is of the form P ∩ {z ∈ R k | c z = γ} where P ⊆ {z ∈ R k | c z ≤ γ}. It can be shown that any face of P can be obtained by turning some of the inequalities that define P into equalities (Schrijver, 1986, Section 8.3 ). If a face of P consists of a single point, it is called a vertex of P. If S ⊆ X × Y for sets S, X, Y, then {x ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ S for some y ∈ Y } is called the projection of S on X, also written as {x | (x, y) ∈ S }.
A bimatrix game is a pair (A, B) of m × n matrices where player 1 chooses a row i and player 2 simultaneously chooses a column j with the corresponding entry of A as payoff to player 1 and of B to player 2. The sets X and Y of mixed strategies of player 1 and player 2 are given by
For the mixed strategy pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y, the expected payoffs to the two players are x Ay and x By, respectively. A best response x of player 1 against y maximizes his expected payoff x Ay, and a best response y of player 2 against x maximizes her expected payoff x By. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of mutual best responses.
The following well-known characterization (Nash, 1951) states that x is a best response to y if and only if every pure strategy i of player 1 that is played with positive probability x i gives maximum expected payoff (Ay) i to player 1, and similarly for player 2.
LEMMA 1 Let (A, B) be an m × n bimatrix game. Consider the polyhedra
Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y. Then x is a best response to y if and only if (y, u) ∈ Q and for all rows i (4)
and y is a best response to x if and only if (x, v) ∈ P and for all columns j
If both conditions hold, then u and v are the unique payoffs to player 1 and 2 in the Nash equilibrium (x, y).
The following lemma states the well-known fact that the equilibria of a bimatrix game are unchanged when substracting a separate constant b j from each column j of the row player's payoff matrix.
LEMMA 2 Call two games strategically equivalent if they have the same Nash equilibria. If b ∈ R n , then the m × n game (A, B) is strategically equivalent to the game (A − 1b , B).
PROOF: This holds by Lemma 1, because the equilibrium payoff u to player 1 in the game (A 
The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are played with positive probability. A bimatrix game is degenerate if there is a mixed strategy that has more pure best responses than the size of its support (von Stengel, 2002) . Among all m × n games, degenerate games form a set of measure zero, so a "generic" game is nondegenerate. Most of our results hold for general games that may be degenerate.
The object of study of our paper are bimatrix games of fixed rank, introduced by Kannan and Theobald (2010) , which generalize zero-sum games which are games of rank zero.
DEFINITION 3
The rank of a bimatrix game (A, B) is the matrix rank of A + B.
LEMMA 4 An m × n bimatrix game of positive rank k can be written as (A, C + ab ) for suitable a ∈ R m , b ∈ R n , and a game (A, C) of rank (k − 1). PROOF: This is due to the well-known result that an m × n matrix is of rank at most k if and only if it can be written as the sum of k rank-1 matrices, that is, as a 1 b 1 + · · · + a k b k for suitable a l ∈ R m and b l ∈ R n for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. This is easily seen by writing the jth column of the matrix as ∑ k l=1 a l b lj and letting b l = (b l1 , . . . , b ln ) (see also Wardlaw, 2005) .
The following is a simple but central observation.
The following are equivalent: (a) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A, C + ab ), (b) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A, C + 1λb ) and x a = λ, (c) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A − 1λb , C + 1λb ) and x a = λ.
PROOF: The equivalence of (a) and (b) holds because the players get in both games the same expected payoffs for their pure strategies: this is immediate for player 1, and if x a = λ, then the column payoffs are given by
The games in (b) and (c) are strategically equivalent by Lemma 2.
Consider a game (A, B) of positive rank k where B = C + ab so that (A, C) is a game of rank k − 1 according to Lemma 4. Then the game (A − 1λb , C + 1λb ) in Lemma 5(c) has the same sum A + C of its payoff matrices and hence also rank k − 1, for any choice of the parameter λ. Let N be the set of Nash equilibria (NE) together with λ of these parameterized games,
These considerations imply the following main result of this section. THEOREM 6 Given a bimatrix game (A, C + ab ), its set of Nash equilibria is exactly the projection on X × Y of the intersection of N and the hyperplane H defined by
Theorem 6 asserts that for any rank-k game of the form (A, C + ab ), every Nash equilibrium of the game is captured by the set N in (7) of games of rank k − 1 which are parameterized by λ, intersected with the hyperplane H in (9). Can this rank reduction be leveraged to get an efficient algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for a game of arbitrary constant rank? This does not work in general, but it does for rank-1 games.
PARAMETERIZED LINEAR PROGRAMS
Our aim is to describe the equilibria of rank-1 games (A, −A + ab ) using the rank reduction of the previous section. For this, we consider the set N in (8) for C = −A,
By Lemma 2, this is the set of equilibria of zero-sum games parameterized by λ. These correspond to the solutions of a parameterized linear program (LP). In this section, we review the structure of such parameterized LPs with a particular view towards nongeneric cases and polynomial-time algorithms as studied by Adler and Monteiro (1992) . In essence, there are finitely many special values of the parameter λ called breakpoints. These separate the set N into a connected sequence of polyhedral segments (which generically are line segments). They are described in Theorem 16 in the next section, where we will present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding one equilibrium of a rank-1 game, and in the subsequent section another algorithm for finding all equilibria. We assume familiarity with notions of linear programming such as LP duality and complementary slackness; see, for example, Schrijver (1986) . The following well-known lemma (Dantzig, 1963, p. 286) states that the equilibria of a zero-sum game are the primal and dual solutions to an LP.
LEMMA 7 Consider an m × n zero-sum game (M, −M). In any equilibrium (x, y) of this game, y is a minmax strategy of player 2, which is a solution to the LP with variables y in R n and u in R:
and x is a maxmin strategy of player 1, which is a solution to the dual LP to (11). For the optimal value of u in (11), the maxmin payoff to player 1 and minmax cost to player 2 and hence value of the game is −u.
PROOF: The dual LP to (11) has variables x ∈ R m and v ∈ R and states
Both LPs are feasible (with sufficiently small u and large v). Let (y, u) be an optimal solution to (11) and (x, v) to (12). Then u = v by LP duality, and (11) and (12) state My ≤ 1(−u), that is, player 2 pays no more than −u for any row, and x M ≥ (−v)1 , that is, player 1 gets at least −v in every column, where −u = −v which is therefore the value of the game, and (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium.
Applied to M = A − 1λb , the LP (11) says:
The substitution u = λb y + t gives the equivalent LP (14) maximize
Throughout, we stay close to the notation in Adler and Monteiro (1992) . We write the LP (14) as
The LP D λ has a parameterized objective function over the fixed polyhedron D.
It is the dual of the following LP P λ which has a fixed objective function with a parameterized right hand side, where we use slack variables s ∈ R n to express the inequality A x + 1v ≥ bλ as an equality:
(17)
For optimal solutions (y, t) to D λ and (x, v, s) to P λ we have λb y + t = v. The next lemma states that −t and v can be interpreted as the player's payoffs for the games in Lemma 5(a) and (b).
LEMMA 8 Let λ ∈ R. Then (x, y) is an equilibrium of the game (A, −A + 1λb ) if and only if (y, t) is an optimal solution to D λ in (15) for some t which is uniquely determined by y, and (x, v, s) is an optimal solution to P λ in (17) for some v and s which are uniquely determined by λ and x. The equilibrium payoffs are −t to player 1 and v to player 2. If x a = λ, these are also the payoffs in the game (A, −A + ab ), and (x, y) is an equilibrium of that game.
PROOF: By Lemma 5 with C = −A, the game (A, −A + ab ) has the same equilibria (x, y) and, by (6), payoffs as the game
Consider any optimal solutions (y, t) to D λ and (x, v, s) to P λ . Then Ay + 1t ≤ 0 states for each row i of A the inequality (Ay) i ≤ −t. Complementary slackness, equivalent to LP optimality, states that (Ay) i = −t whenever x i > 0. This is the equilibrium condition in (4) that states that x is a best response to y. Because it holds for at least one i, it uniquely determines −t, which is the equilibrium payoff to player 1 in the above games.
Similarly, the constraint s = A x − bλ + 1v in (17) means that s is determined by (x, λ, v) , and states s j = (A x − bλ) j + v ≥ 0 for all j, or equivalently ((−A + bλ1 )x) j ≤ v. Complementary slackness, equivalent to LP optimality, states that this inequality is tight whenever y j > 0. This is the condition (5) that states that y is a best response to x in the game (A, −A + 1λb ), and it uniquely determines v as the equilibrium payoff to player 2.
Primal-dual pairs P λ , D λ of LPs with a parameter λ have been studied since Gass and Saaty (1955) . The next result is well known, which we show following Jansen et al. (1997) .
LEMMA 9 For λ ∈ R, let φ(λ) be the optimum value of P λ and hence of D λ . Then φ : R → R is the pointwise maximum of a finite number of affine functions on R and therefore piecewise linear and convex.
PROOF: The optimum of D λ exists for any λ and is taken at a vertex of the polyhedron D in (16). Let V be the set of vertices of D, which is finite. Hence
Hence φ is the pointwise maximum of a finite number of affine functions as claimed. The epigraph of φ given by E = {(λ, θ) | θ ≥ φ(λ)} is the intersection of the convex epigraphs of these affine functions, so E is convex and φ is a convex function.
By (18), the function φ(λ) is the "upper envelope" of the affine functions λ → λ(b y) + t defined by the vertices (y, t) of D. A breakpoint is any λ * so that φ(λ) has different left and right derivatives when λ approaches λ * from below or above, denoted by φ − (λ * ) and φ + (λ * ).
For any LP P, say, let OptFace(P) be the face of the domain of P where its optimum is attained. For any λ we denote
Then the left and right derivatives of φ at λ are characterized as follows (obvious from (18), also Prop. 2.4 of Adler and Monteiro (1992) ):
which are the optima of the two LPs
That is, λ * is a breakpoint if and only if φ − (λ * ) < φ + (λ * ). Clearly, in that case there are at least two vertices (y, t) and (ŷ,t) of D that define two different affine (18). These are also vertices of Y(λ * ), which is then a higherdimensional face (such as an edge) of D. The following central observation shows that the breakpoints give all the information about the optimal faces Y(λ) of D λ for any λ between these breakpoints.
THEOREM 10 (Adler and Monteiro, 1992, Theorem 4.1) Let λ 1 , . . . , λ K be the breakpoints, in increasing order, for the parameterized LPs P λ and D λ , and let
is an edge of D λ . Then these vertices uniquely describe the pieces of the piecewise linear function φ(λ). An example is shown in the right diagram of Figure 2 below with the constraints (43) for Ay + 1t ≤ 0 in D, with the additional constraints 0 ≤ y 2 ≤ 1 to represent y ∈ Y, and objective function λb y + t given by λ(1 − 2y 2 ) + t. The three linear parts of φ(λ) are
which correspond to the optimal vertices (y 2 , t) of D given by (1, −1), ( 1 2 , − 1 2 ), and (0, −1). The two breakpoints are λ 1 = − 1 2 and λ 2 = 1 2 which correspond to the two edges of D.
In the degenerate case, one typically does not get polynomial-time algorithms by considering vertices and corresponding basic solutions to the LP P λ . Instead of partitioning the variables of P λ into basic and nonbasic variables, Adler and Monteiro (1992) consider "optimal partitions"; we use here only the partition part that replaces the nonbasic variables, which we denote by M(λ) ∪ N(λ) in Definition 12 below (called N(λ) in Adler and Monteiro (1992) ). This is the set of variables of the dual LP D λ that may be strictly positive in an optimal solution, which represent the "true inequalities" of Y(λ).
DEFINITION 11 For some A, b, C, d suppose that the constraints in x
are feasible. Then any row i of Ax ≤ b so that (b − Ax) i > 0 for some feasible x is called a true inequality of (23).
If there are solutions x andx to (23) so that (b − Ax) i > 0 and (b − Ax) j > 0 then both inequalities are true for x 1 2 +x 1 2 , so there is a unique largest set of true inequalities with some feasible solution where all these strict inequalities hold simultaneously.
It can be shown that for such i and j there are optimal solutions (x, v, s) to P λ where x i > 0 and s j > 0, so these are the true inequalities of OptFace(P λ ). This is also known as "strict complementary slackness" (Schrijver, 1986, Section 7.9) . Consider the polyhedron
The following lemma considers the face of Q defined by the equations x i = 0 for i ∈ M(λ) and s j = 0 for j ∈ N(λ), which are necessary and sufficient for a feasible solution to P λ to be optimal. This is immediate from the standard complementary slackness condition.
LEMMA 13 Crucially, according to Theorem 10, for any λ in an open interval (λ r , λ r+1 ) (for 0 ≤ r ≤ K) the optimal face Y(λ) is constant in λ. Hence, the true inequalities (M(λ), N(λ)) of Y(λ) are also equal to some fixed (M, N) for all λ ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ). With the LPs
the following holds.
LEMMA 14 Consider λ 0 , λ 1 , . . . , λ K , λ K+1 and λ r ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ) for 0 ≤ r ≤ K as in Theorem 10. Let M r = M(λ r ) and N r = N(λ r ) (which do not depend on the choice of λ r ). Then for 1 ≤ r ≤ K, (a) the breakpoint λ r is the optimum of the LP BR max (M r−1 , N r−1 ) and of the LP BR min (M r , N r ); Lemma 14(a) implies that for any λ in the open interval (λ r , λ r+1 ), for 1 ≤ r ≤ K − 1, the endpoints of the closed interval [λ r , λ r+1 ] are given by the minimum and maximum of λ for (λ, x, v, s) ∈ Q(M, N) where M = M(λ) and N = N(λ). Lemma 14(b) and Lemma 13 imply that if λ is itself a breakpoint, then Q(M, N) = {λ} × OptFace(P λ ).
As we will describe in detail in the next section, Theorem 10 and Lemma 14 lead to a description of the set of optimal solutions to P λ and D λ for all λ with the help of the breakpoints λ 1 , . . . , λ K in the form of 2K + 1 polyhedral segments (which are lines in the nondegenerate case). Any optimal solution to P λ belongs to Q(M(λ), N(λ)), which is a face of Q, and any optimal solution to D λ belongs to Y(λ), which is a face of D. For λ between two breakpoints, these faces do not change (but x typically varies with λ), and their cartesian product defines K + 1 of the segments. If λ is equal to a breakpoint, the set Q(M(λ), N(λ)) is a subset of the two adjoining faces Q(M(λ ), N(λ )) for λ near λ, whereas Y(λ) is a superset of the adjoining faces Y(λ ), as described in Theorem 10. This defines the other K segments. Using this we will give a precise description of the set N in Theorem 16 below.
Adler and Monteiro (1992) describe how to generate the breakpoints of P λ , D λ in polynomial time per breakpoint, with a polynomial-time algorithm applied to the LPs (15), (21), (27), which we will adapt to our purpose. (However, the number of breakpoints may be exponential, as shown by Murty (1980) .) The true inequalities in Definition 11 can also be found with an LP, according to the following lemma (Prop. 4.1 of Adler and Monteiro (1992) ), due to Freund et al. (1985) ; for an alternative polynomial-time algorithm see Mehrotra and Ye (1993) .
LEMMA 15 For A, b, C, d and the constraints (23) consider the LP
Then (23) is feasible if and only if (28) is feasible and bounded, and any optimal solution x * , u * , α * to (28) satisfies u * i = 1 (and u * i = 0 otherwise) if and only if i is a true inequality of (23). For such a solution to (28), x = x * (1/α * ) is a solution to (23) where (b − Ax) i > 0 for all true inequalities i.
PROOF: If the LP (28) is feasible then it is also bounded because u ≤ 1. Let I be the set of true inequalities of Ax ≤ b. Choose α * ≥ 1 so that α * ≥ 1/ε i for all i ∈ I. Then (bα * − A(xα * )) i = (b − Ax) i α * = ε i α * ≥ 1 for i ∈ I. Hence, x * = xα * and u * defined by u * i = 1 if i ∈ I, and u * i = 0 otherwise, give a feasible solution x * , u * , α * to the LP (28). This solution is also optimal because any solutionx,û,α to (28) whereû i > 0 would give a solution x =x(1/α) to (23) with (b − Ax) i > 0 and thus i ∈ I, so for any feasible solution (x, u, α) to (28) we have u i = 0 whenever i ∈ I. This proves the claim.
FINDING ONE EQUILIBRIUM OF A RANK-1 GAME BY BINARY SEARCH
We use the results of the previous section to present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding one equilibrium of a rank-1 game (A, −A + ab ), using binary search for a suitable value of the parameter λ in Theorem 6. The search maintains a pair of successively closer parameter values and corresponding equilibria of the game (A, −A + 1λb ) that are on opposite sides of the hyperplane H in (9). Generically, the set N in (10) is a piecewise linear path which has to intersect H between these two parameter values. In general, the segments of that "path" are products of certain faces of the polyhedra D in (15) and Q in (25) described in Theorem 10 and Lemma 14 using the breakpoints λ 1 , . . . , λ K of the LPs P λ and D λ .
We give a complete description of N in terms of these faces of Q and D, which we project to R × X (for the possible values of (λ, x)) and Y. Namely, consider λ 0 , λ 1 , . . . , λ K , λ K+1 and λ r ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ) for 0 ≤ r ≤ K as in Theorem 10. For
Note that for any (λ, x, v, s) ∈ Q(M(λ ), N(λ )) (for any λ ∈ R) the components v and s are uniquely determined by (λ, x) by Lemma 8. Similarly, let
where again t in (y, t) is uniquely determined by y. Recall that the choice of λ r ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ) does not matter for the definitions of X r and Y r . The polyhedra X r × Y r for 0 ≤ r ≤ K (which for r = 0 and r = K + 1 are infinite, otherwise bounded) represent K + 1 of the segments that constitute N between any two breakpoints λ r and λ r+1 . They are successively connected by K further segments, which are polytopes X r × Y r that correspond to the breakpoints themselves. These are for 1 ≤ r ≤ K defined by
THEOREM 16
The set N in (10) is given by
PROOF: This follows from Lemma 8, Lemma 13, and Theorem 10. By Theorem 10, Y(λ r ) is the optimal face of SL max (λ r ) which is a subset of Y(λ r ). Hence Y r ⊆ Y r , and similarly Y r−1 ⊆ Y r , which implies (34). In addition, we have M(λ r ) ⊆ M(λ r ) and N(λ r ) ⊆ N(λ r ) and thus X r ⊆ X r because of the additional tight constraints in Q(M(λ r ), N(λ r )). Similarly, X r ⊆ X r−1 . This shows (35).
The preceding characterization of N is used in the following lemma.
LEMMA 17 Let λ ≤ λ and x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y so that for N in (10)
Then x a = λ for some (λ, x, y) ∈ N with λ ∈ [λ, λ].
PROOF: Consider the largest λ * so that λ * ∈ [λ, λ] and there are x * , y * with (λ * , x * , y * ) ∈ N and λ * ≤ x * a, which exists since λ fulfills this property and N is closed by Theorem 16. If λ * = λ then both (λ * , x) and (λ * , x * ) belong to the same set X r or X r which is convex, where since x a ≤ λ * and λ * ≤ x * a we have x a = λ * for a suitable convex combination x of x and x * , and (λ * , x, y * ) ∈ N , as claimed.
Hence we can assume λ * < λ. Suppose λ * is a breakpoint λ r , so that (λ * , x * ) ∈ X r . Consider λ ∈ (λ r , min{λ r+1 , λ}) and (λ , x , y ) ∈ X r × Y r where λ > x a by maximality of λ * . By (35), we have (λ * , x * ) ∈ X r and hence (λ * , x * , y ) ∈ X r × Y r . Because λ * ≤ x * a and λ > x a, a suitable convex combination (λ, x, y ) of (λ * , x * , y ) and (λ , x , y ) belongs to N and fulfills λ = x a as claimed (in fact, (λ, x, y ) = (λ * , x * , y ) does by maximality of λ * ). If λ * is not a breakpoint, we directly have (λ * , x * , y * ) ∈ X r × Y r for some r and can choose (λ , x , y * ) ∈ X r × Y r with λ * < λ ≤ λ and apply the same argument.
The binary search algorithm will maintain (36) as an invariant while halving the length of the interval [λ, λ] in each iteration. For λ = (λ + λ)/2, let x be part of an equilibrium (x , y ) of the game (A, −A + 1λ b ). We then check if there is an equilibrium (x, y) of the game (A, −A + 1λb ) with x a = λ for some λ between λ and the next breakpoint λ r , which is determined by Lemma 14. For that purpose, we introduce the following variations of the LPs in (27):
LEMMA 18 Let λ r be a breakpoint of P λ and D λ as in Theorem 10, 1 ≤ r ≤ K. Let λ ∈ R, let (x , v , s ) be an optimal solution to P λ , and let (M, N) = (M(λ ), N(λ )) as in (24). PROOF: We prove (a), where (b) is entirely analogous. By Lemma 13, (λ , x , v , s ) is feasible for Q max (M, N, a, λ ). Clearly λ ≤ λ * , and Lemma 14 implies λ * ≤ λ r . Because λ ≤ x a for any feasible solution (λ, x, v, s), the objective function λ − x a is nonpositive, and zero and hence optimal if and only λ = x a, in which case x is part of the described equilibrium (x, y).
The algorithm, which we call BINSEARCH, is shown in Figure 1 , which we now explain in detail. The conditions x a = λ and x ∈ X mean that λ is a convex combination of the components a 1 , . . . , a m of a and therefore between their minimum α and maximum α defined in line 3 of the algorithm. The search will terminate with (x * , y * , λ * ) ∈ N ∩ H, where λ * ∈ [α, α] . In order to avoid separate considerations for the possibility that λ * is equal to α or α itself, we start with a larger search interval [λ, λ] in line 4. The main loop of the algorithm is between lines 5 and 20. The candidate value for λ is the midpoint between λ and λ in line 6. In the first iteration λ will be in the range [α, α] but in later iterations it may not be, which is adjusted in lines 7 and 8 to avoid unnecessary computations (for example if the components a 1 , . . . , a m of a are in a small range, about which no assumptions are made). Line 9 computes some optimal solution (x, v, s) of the LP P λ in (17) with x as part of an equilibrium (x, y) of the game (A, −A + 1λb ) by Lemma 8. The strategy y, although not needed at this stage, is found by the dual LP D λ in (15) which is typically solved alongside P λ . If x a = λ, tested in line 10, a solution (x * , y * ) is found and output in lines 21 and 22.
output (x * , y * ) FIGURE 1.-The BINSEARCH algorithm for finding one Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game (A, −A + ab ).
If x a = λ, then the optimum φ(λ) of P λ and D λ determines the optimal face Y(λ) of D λ in (19). The true inequalities M, N of Y(λ) in line 13 are determined according to (24), for example with the help of the LP in Lemma 15. The goal is then to use M, N to increase λ (if λ < x a) or decrease λ (if x a < λ) toward the next breakpoint using Lemma 14. Consider the case λ < x a, handled in lines 14 to 16. In line 15, the LP Q max (M, N, a, λ) is defined in (37). By Lemma 18, the optimum λ * to this LP will find the desired equilibrium with λ * = x * a if there is one until the next breakpoint λ r , and at any rate λ ≤ λ * ≤ λ r . Then (note (λ + λ)/2 = λ unless line 7 was invoked)
which implies λ − λ * ≤ (λ − λ)/2 . The next value of λ is set to λ * in line 16. Hence, if the loop continues because λ * < x * a, then in the next iteration the difference λ − λ has shrunk by at least one half. The case x a < λ in lines 17 to 19 is handled analogously, resulting either in x * a = λ * or in x * a < λ * where λ * ∈ [λ r , λ], which will be the next value of λ in line 19. In both cases, the invariant (36) is preserved, and the length of the interval [λ, λ] shrinks by at least a factor of two per iteration.
The following theorem states the correctness and polynomial running time of the algorithm, measured in terms of the number of bits to represent A, a, b, which are assumed to have rational numbers as entries.
THEOREM 19 Algorithm BINSEARCH finds one equilibrium of the rank-1 game (A, −A + ab ). Using polynomial-time LP solvers, its running time is polynomial in the number of bits that represent A, a, b.
PROOF: Each iteration of the algorithm solves three LPs. The first is P λ in line 9. Using the optimum φ(λ) of that LP, in line 13 the true inequalities in (24) of Y(λ) in (19) are found with another LP as in Lemma 15. The third LP is either Q max (M, N, a, λ) in line 15 or Q min (M, N, a, λ) in line 18. All these LPs are described in terms of A, a, b, including λ which is the result of a previously solved LP in terms of these data. Hence, these LPs can be solved in polynomial time in the bit size of A, a, b. The number of iterations of the main loop is also polynomial, which is seen as follows. By Lemma 14, any breakpoint λ r is the optimum of an LP in (27). Therefore λ r has bit size B bounded by a polynomial in the bit size of A and b (Schrijver, 1986, Corollary 10.2a(iii) ). Hence, any two breakpoints have minimum distance 1/2 B . Because the length of the search interval [λ, λ] with λ < x a and x a < λ as in (36) shrinks by at least half in each iteration, there will be at most O(B) iterations until that search interval consists contains at most one breakpoint λ r . If there is no breakpoint in [λ, λ] , then (M(λ), N(λ)) = (M(λ), N(λ)) and a solution (λ * , x * , v * , s * ) to Q max (M(λ), N(λ), a, λ) will give an equilibrium (x * , y * ) to (A, −A + ab ) by Lemma 18 and Lemma 5. If there is a single breakpoint λ r in [λ, λ] , the same will hold either for this LP or for Q min (M(λ), N(λ), a, λ), again by Lemma 18 and Lemma 5.
ENUMERATING ALL EQUILIBRIA OF A RANK-1 GAME
In this section, we show how to obtain a complete description of all Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game with the help of Theorem 6 and Theorem 16.
A degenerate bimatrix game may have infinite sets of Nash equilibria. They can be described via maximal Nash subsets (Jansen, 1981) , called "sub-solutions" by Nash (1951) . A Nash subset for (A, B) is a nonempty product set S × T where S ⊆ X and T ⊆ Y so that every (x, y) in S × T is an equilibrium of (A, B); in other words, any two equilibrium strategies x ∈ S and y ∈ T are "exchangeable". Using the "best response polyhedra" P and Q in (3), it can be shown that any maximal Nash subset S × T is a polytope, with S as a suitable face of P projected to X, and T as a suitable face of Q projected to Y (Avis et al., 2010) . These faces are defined by converting some inequalities in (3) to equations, which have to fulfill the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5). The usual output for "enumerating" all equilibria consists of listing all maximal Nash subsets S × T via the vertices of S and T. These are vertices of P and Q, respectively (projected to X and Y) that define the "extreme" Nash equilibria of (A, B), with maximal Nash subsets obtained as maximally exchangeable sets of such vertices (Avis et al., 2010, Prop. 4 ).
Maximal Nash subsets may intersect, in which case their vertex sets intersect. In a nondegenerate game, all maximal Nash subsets are singletons.
For a rank-1 game (A, −A + ab ), its set of Nash equilibria is N ∩ H projected to X × Y by Theorem 6, with N in (10) and H in (9). By (33), N is the union of polyhedra, whose nonempty intersections with H give almost directly the maximal Nash subsets.
THEOREM 20 Let (A, −A + ab ) be a rank-1 bimatrix game, and let λ 0 , λ 1 , . . . , λ K , λ K+1 and λ r ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ) for 0 ≤ r ≤ K as in Theorem 10. With (29), (30), (31), (32), let
Then the maximal Nash subsets of (A, −A + ab ) are the sets S r × Y r if S r = ∅, and S r × Y r if S r = ∅ and L r is not equal to {λ r } or {λ r+1 }.
PROOF: Each set S r is the projection of (X r × Y r ) ∩ H on X, and S r is the projection of (X r × Y r ) ∩ H on X, with L r and L r containing the corresponding set of λ's. Hence, by Theorem 16, if S r = ∅ then S r × Y r is a Nash subset, and if S r = ∅ then S r × Y r is a Nash subset, and the union of these is the set of all equilibria which is the projection of N ∩ H on X × Y by Theorem 6. The only question is which of these Nash subsets are inclusion-maximal. By Adler and Monteiro (1992, Corollary 3.2), Y r ∩ Y r+1 = Y r where Y r and Y r+1 contain Y r properly, Y r ∩ Y s = ∅ whenever |r − s| ≥ 2, and Y r ∩ Y s = ∅ whenever r = s, and Lemma 14 implies L r = {λ r } = L r−1 ∩ L r . So the only possible inclusions are that S r × Y r is a subset of S r × Y r or of S r+1 × Y r+1 . Suppose x ∈ S r , that is, (λ, x) ∈ X r and x a = λ. If this implies λ = λ r then L r = {λ r }. By Lemma 13, this means x is part of an optimal solution (x, v, s) to P λ r and hence x ∈ S r , which shows the
These are the only possible inclusions because if x ∈ S r with (λ, x) ∈ X r so that x a = λ ∈ {λ r , λ r+1 } we clearly cannot have x ∈ S r , say, where x a = λ r . This proves the theorem. We also note that the described sets S r and S r are defined in terms of the game (A, −A + ab ) independently of the parameter λ. Namely, the condition x a = a x = λ implies that the polyhedron P in (3) for B = −A + ab is given by
so S r and S r are projections of certain faces of P.
A suitable algorithm that enumerates all Nash equilibria can be adapted from the algorithm by Adler and Monteiro (1992, p. 173 ) that proceeds from breakpoint to breakpoint using Theorem 10. The corresponding segments of N can then be checked for nonempty intersections with H, which are then output as maximal Nash subsets if they meet the conditions of Theorem 20.
We give an outline of this algorithm. Suppose λ is equal to a breakpoint λ r . Then Y r in (32) is the projection of Y(λ r ) = OptFace(D λ r ), and X r in (31) is the projection of OptFace(P λ r ) by Lemma 14(b) and Lemma 13. If X r ∩ H is not empty, its projection to X is a maximal Nash subset S r × Y r . Start from some (λ, x) ∈ X r . If λ = x a then x ∈ S r , which is a suitable starting point for the vertex enumeration of the polytope S r , for example with the program lrs (Avis, 2018) . If λ < x a or λ > x a then the condition X r ∩ H = ∅ is checked with one of the LPs in (37) by Lemma 18.
The next segment to be tested for its intersection with H is X r × Y r in (29) and (30) . For that purpose it is not necessary to find some λ ∈ (λ r , λ r+1 ), because Y(λ ) = OptFace(SL max (λ r )) by Theorem 10, and the true inequalities M ∪ N of that face are found by Lemma 15, so that one obtains X r as the projection of Q(M, N). Moreover, we have x ∈ X r ⊆ X r . If λ = x a then x is also a starting point for the enumeration of the vertices of S r , which gives the Nash subset S r × Y r (which is, however, not maximal if S r ⊆ S r , see Theorem 20). If λ < x a then we solve Q max (M, N, a, λ r ) in (37) to find out if H intersects the current segment X r × Y r , and similarly Q min (M, N, a, λ r ) if λ > x a. Finally, the next breakpoint λ r+1 is found as the solution to BR max (M, N) in (27) by Lemma 14(a).
For initialization and termination of this algorithm, we use that the possible values of λ can be restricted to [α, α] with α and α as minimum and maximum of {a 1 , . . . , a m }. The initialization is λ = α, which is decided to be a breakpoint or not as described after (21). The constraint λ ≤ α is added to the step of finding the next breakpoint, which terminates the algorithm when it is found to hold as equality.
This algorithm, based on Theorem 20, for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game, has the following noteworthy features. First, it works for all games (degenerate or not), and its characterization of maximal Nash subsets is simpler than for general bimatrix games (Avis et al., 2010) , and could even be adapted to easily represent these Nash subsets in terms of their inequalities rather than their vertices (which would be of interest if they are high-dimensional). Secondly, the algorithm in effect traverses N which is generically a path. Rather than by solving a succession of LPs, it can also be implemented by a variant of the algorithm by Lemke (1965) with the additional linear constraints λ ≥ x a or λ ≤ x a, depending on the current sign of λ − x a. Here, traversing this path gives all Nash equilibria, whereas for general bimatrix games Lemke's algorithm (as in von Stengel et al., 2002; Govindan and Wilson, 2003) only finds one Nash equilibrium.
Our set-up also allows the direct application of smoothed analysis as pioneered by Spielman and Teng (2004) for the "shadow vertex algorithm" for parameterized LPs. It has been subsequently improved and simplified; for recent develop-ments see Dadush and Huiberts (2018) . In smoothed analysis, the LP data are perturbed by some small Gaussian noise which cancels "pathological" cases that lead to exponential worst-case examples (the game constructed in Section 8 is of this sort). For the parameterized LP, it implies a polynomial number of segments and thus a polynomial number of maximal Nash subsets by Theorem 20. These are all isolated Nash equilibria because the perturbed game is generic and therefore nondegenerate with probability one.
AN EXAMPLE
This section illustrates the results of the previous sections with an example of a rank-1 game. Consider the following rank-1 game (A, B) ,
where a = (2, −1) and b = (1, −1). This game has the two pure equilibria ((1, 0), (1, 0)) and ((0, 1), (0, 1)), and the mixed equilibrium (( 1 4 , 3 4 ), ( 1 2 , 1 2 )). By Theorem 6(b), these are the equilibria (x, y) of the game (A, −A + 1λb ) so that x a = λ. For x = (1, 0), ( 1 4 , 3 4 ), (0, 1), this means λ = 2, − 1 4 , −1. The left two diagrams in Figure 2 show the set N in (10) where (x, y) is an equilibrium of the parameterized game (A, −A + 1λb ), where
These equilibria are pure except when λ ∈ [− 1 2 , 1 2 ], when the unique mixed strategy (1 − x 2 , x 2 ) of player 1 is given by −(1 − x 2 ) + λ = −x 2 − λ, that is, x 2 = 1 2 − λ or λ = 1 2 − x 2 . The white dots indicate the intersection of N with the hyperplane H in (9), which is defined by the equation λ = x a = 2(1 − x 2 ) − x 2 = 2 − 3x 2 , and no constraints on y.
The right diagram in Figure 2 depicts the domain D of the LP D λ in (15), again with y in Y shown as (1 − y 2 , y 2 ), so that the constraints Ay + 1t ≤ 0 become (43) 1 − y 2 + t ≤ 0 and y 2 + t ≤ 0 , and the objective function λb y + t becomes λ(1 − y 2 − y 2 ) + t, with gradient ( ∂ ∂y 2 , ∂ ∂t ) = (−2λ, 1), shown exemplarily in the figure for λ = − 1 4 . For λ > 1 2 , the optimum of D λ is attained at the vertex (y 1 , y 2 , t) = (1, 0, −1) of D, for 1 2 > λ > − 1 2 at the vertex ( 1 2 , 1 2 , − 1 2 ), and for − 1 2 > λ at the vertex (0, 1, −1). For λ 2 = 1 2 and λ 1 = − 1 2 , the optimal face of D λ is an edge of D. These are the two breakpoints λ 1 and λ 2 in Theorem 10. Figure 2 also demonstrates the characterization of the path N in Theorem 16. The left diagram shows (from left to right) the three pieces X 2 , X 1 , X 0 , each of which happen to intersect H. In the central diagram, the vertical parts of the (42), for x = (1 − x 2 , x 2 ) ∈ X and y = (1 − y 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Y, and the hyperplane H in (9) . Right: The polyhedron D in (16) with the objective function in (15) for λ = −1/4. path are Y 2 , Y 1 , Y 0 , and the horizontal parts (for the breakpoints) are Y 2 and Y 1 . This corresponds to the following, more elementary game-theoretic explanation. Except when λ = − 1 2 or λ = 1 2 , player 2's equilibrium strategy y in the game (A, −A + 1λb ) is constant in λ, which holds because player 1's payoff matrix A does not change with λ and y is chosen so as to make player 1 indifferent between the pure strategies in the support of his equilibrium strategy. When λ = − 1 2 or λ = 1 2 , the game is degenerate, and player 2's equilibrium strategies form a line segment, which allows the change of support of her equilibrium strategy y.
8. RANK-1 GAMES WITH EXPONENTIALLY MANY EQUILIBRIA. Kannan and Theobald (2010, Open Problem 9) asked if a rank-1 game may possibly have only a polynomial number of Nash equilibria. This is not the case, according to the following theorem.
THEOREM 21 Let p > 2 and let (A, B) be the n × n bimatrix game with entries of A (44)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and B = A . Then A + B is of rank 1, and (A, B) is a nondegenerate bimatrix game with 2 n − 1 many Nash equilibria.
PROOF: By (44), A + B = ab with the n components of a and b defined by a i = p i and b j = 2p j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so A + B is of rank 1.
Let y ∈ Y with support S. Consider a row i and let T = {j ∈ S | j > i}. Because A is upper triangular, the expected payoff against y in row i is (45) (Ay) i = a ii y i + ∑ j∈T a ij y j .
Suppose i ∈ S. If T is empty, then (Ay) i = 0 < (Ay) 1 , otherwise let t = min T and note that for j ∈ T we have a ij = 2p i+j < p 1+i+j ≤ p t+j ≤ a tj , so (Ay) i < (Ay) t . Hence, no row i outside S is a best response to y. Similary, because the game is symmetric, any column that is a best response to x in X belongs to the support of x. This shows that the game is nondegenerate. Moreover, if (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A, B) , then x and y have equal supports.
For any nonempty subset S of {1, . . . , n}, we construct a mixed strategy y with support S so that (y, y) is an equilibrium of (A, B). This implies that the game has 2 n − 1 many equilibria, one for each support set S. The equilibrium condition holds if (Ay) i = u for i ∈ S with equilibrium payoff u, because then (Ay) i < u for i ∈ S as shown above. We start with s = max S, where (Ay) s = a ss y s = u, by fixing u as some positive constant (e.g., u = 1), which determines y s . Once y i is known for all i ∈ S (and y i = 0 for i ∈ S), we scale y and u by multiplication with 1/1 y so that y becomes a mixed strategy. Assume that i ∈ S and T = {j ∈ S | j > i} = ∅ and assume that y k has been found for all k in T so that (Ay) k = u for all k in T, which is true for T = {s}. Then, as shown above, ∑ j∈T a ij y j < ∑ j∈T a tj y j = (Ay) t = u for t = min T, so y i is determined by (Ay) i = u in (45), and y i > 0. By induction, this determines y i for all i in S, and after re-scaling gives the desired equilibrium strategy y.
By Theorem 6, the equilibria (x, y) of a rank-1 game are the intersection of the path N in (10) with the hyperplane H in (9). The exponential number of Nash equilibria of the game in Theorem 21 shows that N has exponentially many line segments. Murty (1980) describes a parameterized LP with such an exponentially long path of length 2 n . The payoffs for the game in Theorem 21 have been inspired by Murty's example, but are not systematically constructed from it, which would be interesting. For further discussions and related work on the maximal number of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, such as von Stengel (1999), see von Stengel (2012).
A RANK-PRESERVING STRUCTURE THEOREM
The structure theorem by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986 , Theorem 1) (KM) states that the equilibrium correspondence over the set Γ of strategic-form games with a given number of players and numbers of strategies is homeomorphic to Γ itself. In this section, we first recall the KM homeomorphism, and then present a similar structure theorem with a new homeomorphism for bimatrix games that preserves rank.
Let Γ be the set of m × n bimatrix games (A, B) and E ⊆ Γ × X × Y be its equilibrium correspondence,
To distinguish the dimensions of the all-zero and all-one vectors we write them as 0, 1 ∈ R m and 0, 1 ∈ R n . Let a and b be the vectors of row and column averages of A and B,
Then A and B correspond uniquely to pairs (Ã, a) and (B, b) with
with a and b as in (47). The KM homeomorphism φ : Γ → E has an inverse that maps (A, B, x, y) in E to (C, D) in Γ,
where (C, D) has the same "base game" (Ã,B) as (A, B) but different parameters (Ax + y) ∈ R m and (B x + y) ∈ R n . The equilibrium (x, y) and A and B can be recovered from the latter due to the following lemma.
LEMMA 22 Given c ∈ R m and d ∈ R n , there are unique x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, p ∈ R m and q ∈ R d so that c = x + p, d = y + q, and
PROOF: For t ∈ R, let t + = max(t, 0), and
where u (and similary v) can be considered as the unique lowest "water level" t so that the "heights" of the components c i of c that are "above the waterline" sum up to (at most) one. Then x i = (c i − u) + for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and y j = (d j − v) + for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and p = c − x and q = d − y fulfill (50).
The KM homeomorphism φ : (C, D) → (A, B, x, y) is then defined as follows. Let c = C1 1 n and d = D 1 1 m , so thatÃ = C − c1 andB = D − 1d , and apply Lemma 22 to obtain c = x + p and d = y + q. If Ax = p and By = q then (50) is equivalent to the best-response conditions (4) and (5), that is, (x, y) is the equilibrium of (A, B) so that (A, B, x, y) corresponds to (C, D) . Indeed, c − x = q = Ay = (Ã + a1 )y =Ãy + a gives a = Ay −Ãy = c − x −Ãy, and similarly b = d − y −B x, which determines A and B by (48).
The following theorem states that there is a new homeomophism ψ : Γ → E that preserves the sum of the payoff matrices and therefore also the rank of the involved games.
THEOREM 23 There is a homeomorphism ψ : Γ → E, (C, D) → (A, B, x, y) so that C + D = A + B for all (C, D) ∈ Γ.
PROOF: Like for the KM homeomorphism, we first describe the inverse of ψ, which maps (A, B, x, y) in E to (C, D) in Γ. We will use a new parameterization of the matrix A in R m×n . Any such A corresponds uniquely to a quadruple (Â, γ, a, b) withÂ ∈ R m×n , γ ∈ R, a ∈ R m , and b ∈ R n according to (52) A =Â + 1γ1 + a1 + 1b so that (53) 1 Â = 0 ,Â1 = 0, 1 a = 0, b 1 = 0 .
It is easy to see thatÂ, γ, a, and b are uniquely given by A, (52), and (54) γ = 1 m 1 A1 1 n , a = A1 1 n − 1γ, b = 1 m 1 A − γ1 .
Let (x, y) be an equilibrium of (A, B). Let A be represented as in (52) where ρ : R m → R m and σ : R n → R n are shifts by constants to achieve 1 ρ(x) = 0 and 1 σ(y) = 0 for any x ∈ R m and y ∈ R n , namely (57) ρ(x) = x − 1( 1 m 1 x), σ(y) = y − 1( 1 n 1 y) (ρ and σ are the linear projections on the hyperplane through the origin with normal vector 1 respectively 1). With C thus encoded, we let D = A + B − C so that C + D = A + B.
The inverse map (C, D) → (A, B, x, y) defines the homeomorphism ψ : Γ → E and is obtained as follows. Let (C, D) ∈ Γ. Similar to (52) we represent C by (55) where as in (54) (58) γ = 1 m 1 C1 1 n , c = C1 1 n − 1γ, d = 1 m 1 C − γ1 , which implies (59) 1 Â = 0 ,Â1 = 0, 1 c = 0, d 1 = 0 .
Next, given c and d, determine x ∈ X and y ∈ Y by Lemma 22 so that c = x + p and d = y + q and (50) holds. Note that if c and d have been obtained from (A, B, x, y) in E via (56), then this gives back x and y because of the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) since Ay + x and c differ only by a constant shift (a multiple of 1), and similarly B x + y and d differ only by a multiple of 1, which does not affect (51) and (50). With x, y,Â, and γ obtained from C, we next determine a. Because ρ(x + 1t) = ρ(x) and ρ(x + x ) = ρ(x) + ρ(x ) for any x, x ∈ R m and t ∈ R, we have In analogy to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Appendix B) , one consequence of Theorem 23 is the existence of an equilibrium component in a game (A, B) that is stable with respect to small perturbations that preserve the sum A + B of the payoff matrices. In such a perturbation, any change to a payoff of player 1 is coupled with the corresponding negative change to the payoff of player 2, as when it applies to entries of the matrix A in a rank-1 game given as (A, −A + ab ).
CONCLUSIONS
One open question is the following: Is it NP-hard to decide if a rank-1 game has more than one Nash equilibrium? The problem is that when the binary search succeeds, it gives no further information if the game has an additional equilibrium. The exponential example may allow constructing examples where there are exponentially many potential Nash equilibria, which may represent satisfying assignments in a 3SAT formula, in order to obtain an NP-hardness proof.
